스폰서 소유권과 배당정책이 리츠의 대리인 비용에 미치는 효과 = Sponsor Ownership, Dividend Policy, and Agency Cost of REIT

리츠의 스폰서 소유권과 배당정책이 대리인 비용에 미치는 영향을 분석한다.

This paper examines the effect of sponsor ownership and dividend policy on the agency cost using Asian REIT data. The sponsored REIT structure is widely considered as the main cause of agency problems. While the relationship between the sponsor ownership and firm value or performance has been widely investigated, little evidence is available for the agency cost of sponsored REIT. This study would like to contribute to filling this gap. The empirical results show a U-shape relationship between the sponsor ownership and the agency cost. As well, the agency cost tends to increase if the sponsor is the government-related firms.

The findings are in line with existing studies that suggest a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, implying that the system for governmentsponsored REIT need to be supplemented. Another finding in this study is that a dividend policy on the sponsored REIT may be a way to make a profit by depriving opportunities of REIT’s growth, not to reduce the agency cost.